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Abstract
This paper provides an explanation for the choice of currency of invoice of
exports to the U.S. We ﬁnd an empirical relationship between the riskiness
of the exchange rate and the fraction of imports invoiced in the importer’s
currency, the exporter’s currency, and a third country currency. The higher
the volatility of the exchange rate, the larger is the fraction of imports in-
voiced in the importer’s currency. Consequently, the fraction of invoicing in
the exporter’s or a third country currency is inversely related to the volatility
of the exchange rate.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: F14, F31.
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International transactions are aﬀected by exchange rates ﬂuctuations. The
extent to which changes in the exchange rate are transmitted to import
and export prices depends on the choice of currency of invoice that governs
international trade, i.e., whether the prices are set in the exporters’, the
importers’ or a third (vehicle ) currency. The share of trade invoiced in
national currencies or foreign currencies varies across countries and across
time periods. For example, the share of exports and imports invoiced in the
national currencies of several OECD countries during 1996 is as follows: for
the U.S. 98% and 88%, for France 51.7% and 48.4%, for Germany 76.4% and
53.3%, for Italy 40% and 37%, for Japan 35.9% and 22.5%, and for the U.K
62% and 51.7%.1 These aggregate numbers hide the diversity of invoicing
patterns for any given country across its trading patterns.2
Recently more detailed data on U.S. imports invoiced in one of three
possible currencies, the exporter’s, the importer’s or a third currency became
available. These observations, reported in Table 1, lead us to the following
question: Is there any plausible set of explanations that can shed light on
the diversity of the patterns of currency invoicing of trade across countries
and across industries within any country ?
One plausible reason was advanced by Donnenfeld and Zilcha (1991) who
argue that the exporter’s invoicing decision is inﬂuenced by the degree of
exchange rate risk. Given that certain conditions hold, they show that an
exporter will prefer to set the price of exports in the importer’s national cur-
rency rather than its own currency when the exchange rates ﬂuctuate. John-
son and Pick (1997) and Friberg (1998) extended Donnenfeld and Zilcha’s
analysis to incorporate the option of invoicing in a third currency or a ve-
hicle currency. They established that under ﬂuctuating exchange rates the
exporter will prefer to set the price in the importer’s currency rather than in
a third (vehicle) currency.3
Before proceeding to a systematic theoretical and empirical analysis, we
have a look at our data. In Figures 1 to 3 we plot the relationship between,
on the one hand, the fraction of the value of U.S. imports invoiced in the
importer’s, the exporter’s, or in a third currency, and, on the other hand,
the riskiness of the bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rate for each of the sixteen
1See Tavlas (1997).
2For a more detailed account on the invoicing patterns of U.S. aggregate imports see
Alterman (1992).
3Another plausible explanation for the choice of the currency of invoice was recently
put forward by Devereux and Engel (2001). They argue that while two countries trade,
exporters will set their prices in the currency of the country with the more stable monetary
policy.
1exporting countries listed in Table 1. To make the comparison of the invoicing
practices across exporting countries to the U.S., we compute the standard
deviation of the measure of exchange rate risk as deﬁned in Section 4 for the
currency of each of the sixteen countries. The scatter diagrams seem to reveal
a possibly positive correlation between the fraction of U.S. imports invoiced
in the domestic currency and exchange rate risk, whereas the fraction invoiced
in the exporter’s currency and exchange rate risk seems to be likely negatively
correlated. It also appears that there is no obvious relationship between the
fraction of U.S. imports invoiced in a third currency and exchange rate risk.
A systematic empirical analysis should allows us to discern more precise
relationships.
The methodology adopted in this paper is similar to Donnenfeld and
Haug (2001) who investigated the invoicing patterns of Canadian imports.
In that paper data limitations required to conduct the empirical tests for each
industry separately rather than across all industries as we do in this paper.
Furthermore, this investigation is more comprehensive since it encompasses
a larger set of industries and it incorporates exchange rate pass-through.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we discuss
the framework and present the testable hypotheses. In the following section,
we present the empirical model of invoicing and the estimation methods and
estimate the pass-through coeﬃcients to be used. In section 4 we present the
data and their sources. In section 5 we discuss the empirical results and in
the ﬁnal section we provide a summary.
2 The Theoretical Framework
A ﬁrm produces and sells its product in the domestic and foreign markets.
Due to market segmentation the monopolist can set diﬀerent prices across
markets. Decisions are made based on the following sequence of events: First
the ﬁrm selects output (or capacity). Then, upon arrival of new information,
prices are set. The domestic price is always set in the ﬁrm’s own currency.
After the exchange rate is fully known, buyers place their orders and the
goods are shipped. We examine the behavior of the ﬁrm under three pricing-
cum-invoicing strategies of exports: ﬁrst, when export prices are set in the
buyer’s (or equivalently, the importer’s) currency; second, when export prices
are set in the seller’s/exporter’s currency; third when export prices are set
in a third (vehicle) currency. In all cases the ﬁrm precommits to a price at
the time that the actual exchange rate is not known.
The basic set up outlined above is based on the presumption that for-
ward markets are absent. This does not aﬀect the main conclusions in any
meaningful way since the exporting ﬁrm cannot avoid the eﬀects of exchange
rate uncertainty by hedging in forward currency markets. This stems from
2the fact that when the price is set in the exporter’s currency the quantity
that will be sold in the foreign market depends on the uncertain exchange
rate. This in turn implies that the exporter does not know in advance what
amount of foreign currency should be hedged to avoid exchange rate risk.
Furthermore, even if unbiased forward markets were available, the exporter
would not engage in hedging activities since we assumed that he or she is
risk neutral.
Invoicing in the Importer’s Currency. Consider the case where the price
of exports is set in the currency of the importer. The ﬁrm precommits to
prices for both domestic and foreign sales. At this stage output has been
already determined. The ﬁrm observes the signal α and chooses the price
for exports in foreign currency, p∗(α), and the price for domestic sales in
domestic currency p(α).4 Since the foreign demand depends on the foreign
price only, q∗(α) = h∗(p∗(α)), and since the domestic demand depends only
on the domestic price, q(α) = h(p(α)), it follows that the precommitment to
prices fully determines the quantities to be delivered regardless of the actual
value of the exchange rate.
On the assumption that the ﬁrm is risk neutral, its objective is to choose
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where e is the exchange rate, units of the exporter’s currency per unit of the
importer’s currency, Q is the total output, C(Q) denotes the total cost of
production incurred in the exporter’s currency and E is the expectation op-
erator over the random exchange rate. Since R(Q−h∗(p∗(α))) = p(α)h(p(α))
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The maximization problem stated in (3) yields the following necessary and
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4The signal is based on newly arrived information regarding the current account deﬁcit
or surplus, announcements about the interest rates or other information that may aﬀect
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The optimal solution to (4)–(5) is denoted by [Q0,p∗(α)]. By (4) the ﬁrm
chooses the level of output Q0 in a way that equates the marginal cost of
production with the expected marginal revenue from domestic sales (which
depend on the realization of α through the quantity to be exported). From
(5) we see that for each realization of α, the ﬁrm selects the price of exports,
p∗(α), in a manner that equates marginal revenue from domestic sales with
expected marginal revenue from exports.
Invoicing in the Exporter’s Currency. As in the previous section
the ﬁrm ﬁrst chooses its total output. In the subsequent stage, once the
realization of α is known, the ﬁrm sets its export price ˆ p(α), where now the
price is quoted in the exporter’s currency. In contrast to the previous case,
the exporter does not know the actual quantity that will be demanded by the
importers. This quantity is contingent upon the realization of the exchange
rate ˜ θ that will determine the actual price in the importer’s currency, i.e.,
ˆ p∗(α)/(α + ˜ θ).
The ﬁrm’s optimization problem is
max
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∗0(ˆ p
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We denote by [ ˆ Q, ˆ p∗(α)] the solution to (7) and (8). It is noteworthy that
this solution yields a level of total output and a pricing rule that diﬀer from
those obtained in (4) and (5). When the ﬁrm invoices exports in its own
currency, as seen in (7) and (8), both total output and the allocation of sales
across markets are aﬀected by the distribution of ˜ θ. In contrast, when the
ﬁrm sets the price of exports in the importer’s currency, the demand for ex-
ports is independent of the realization of θ. It does, however, depend on the
expected value of θ. This result has signiﬁcant implications for the impact
of exchange rate volatility on pricing and the level of exports.
A Comparison of Pricing-cum-Invoicing Strategies. We highlight the
conditions that lead to the dominance of one invoicing strategy over the other.
4Proposition 1. Invoicing exports in the importer’s currency rather than
in its own currency is more desirable if the foreign total revenue function
R∗(h∗(p∗)) is concave in p∗.
Proof: See Donnenfeld and Zilcha (1991).
The concavity of the foreign revenue function holds for a wide class of
demand functions. Clearly it holds when h∗(p∗) is concave or linear. It holds
also if h∗(p∗) is convex, but not too convex, so that the marginal revenue
does not swing wildly as the price p∗ varies. This condition is equivalent to
the following requirement −ph∗00(p)/h∗0(p) ≤ 2 ∀p.
The eﬀects of changes in the riskiness of the exchange rate are stated in
the proposition below.
Proposition 2. Assume that the foreign marginal revenue R∗0(·) is linear.
An increase in the exchange rate risk makes the choice of invoicing in the
importer’s currency more desirable than invoicing in the exporter’s currency.
Proof: See Donnenfeld and Zilcha (1991).
The intuitive explanation for this result is as follows: When exports are
invoiced in the exporter’s currency, the seller’s proﬁt function is concave in
the exchange rate. Consequently, as the exchange rate risk increases the
expected value of proﬁts declines, due to the concavity of the proﬁt function.
For the case when exports are invoiced in the importer’s currency, the proﬁt
function is linear in the exchange rate. Hence, an increase in the exchange
rate risk has no eﬀect on the seller’s expected proﬁts.
We turn now to the case where the exporting ﬁrm is pricing its exports
in a third currency, a vehicle currency. As before the price of exports is set
before the realization of the exchange rate is known. Unlike the two previ-
ous cases, setting the export price in a vehicle currency entails risk in both
quantities of exports and domestic sales.
Proposition 3. Invoicing in a third (vehicle) currency is less desirable than
invoicing in the importer’s and the exporter’s currency.
Proof: This proposition follows from the proof presented by Johnson and
Pick (1997).
Intuitively, invoicing foreign sales in a third currency leads to ﬂuctuations
in the foreign price. In addition, this also induces ﬂuctuations in the do-
mestic price since the quantity sold in the domestic market is the residual
5of total output. Since, the proﬁt function is concave in the foreign price,
less ﬂuctuations in foreign and domestic revenue is more desirable. Since
the ﬂuctuations are largest when exports are invoiced in a third currency,
invoicing in either the importer’s or the exporter’s currency dominates the
strategy of invoicing in a third currency.
Based on the theoretical approach developed by Donnenfeld and Zilcha
and others we can derive speciﬁc predictions concerning the exporters choice
of currency of invoicing, which can be subjected to empirical test. The
theoretical model predicts that in a regime of exchange rate uncertainty
exporters will prefer to set export prices in the importer’s currency if the
foreign revenue function is concave in the foreign price.5
In addition to the predictions coming out of Donnenfeld and Zilcha (1991),
Johnson and Pick (1997) we shall also consider several alternative explana-
tions for the choice of currency of invoice in international transactions based
on some empirical regularities. Krugman (1984) argues that the currency
chosen to execute transactions by agents (ﬁrms) located in diﬀerent countries
is determined by country-size diﬀerences; the currency of the larger country
is the one that is usually used. This is because ﬁrms in small countries are
more experienced and more sophisticated in dealing with foreign exchange
than their counterparts in large countries. Acquiring sophistication involves
hard to measure ﬁxed cost and thus a large country exporter leaves the small
country importer to worry about the exchange rate.
Tavlas (1991) stressed the importance of a country’s share in world trade
in aﬀecting the likelihood of invoicing international transactions in its cur-
rency. The more important is a country in world trade the more likely it is
that its currency will be chosen for invoicing international transactions with
countries that have a smaller share in world trade.
We now state the following hypotheses that we shall test empirically:
Testable Hypotheses. Under ﬂuctuating exchange rates exports will be
invoiced in the currency of importers rather than in the exporter’s currency
or in a third currency if (i) the total revenue function is concave in foreign
prices (ii) the exporter’s source country is smaller relative to the importer’s
country and (iii) the exporter’s country share in world trade is smaller than
the importer’s country.
Furthermore, (iv) the more volatile the exchange rate is, the larger is the frac-
5When exports are invoiced in the exporter’s currency the revenue function is concave
in foreign prices. When the export price is set in a third currency the revenue function is
also concave in foreign prices. Thus an increase in exchange rate risk reduces the exporter’s
expected proﬁts. On the other hand when the exporter sets foreign prices in the importer’s
currency the revenue function is linear in the exchange rate and an increase in the riskiness
of the exchange rate has no eﬀect on expected proﬁts.
6tion of exports invoiced in the importer’s currency relative to the exporter’s
and the vehicle currency.
To implement the empirical test we need to make one adjustment to part
(i) of the above hypotheses. Due to unavailability of data we cannot verify
empirically the concavity of the exporter’s revenue function in foreign prices.
However, in a recent paper Friberg (1998) showed that for exchange rate pass-
through to be incomplete it is suﬃcient that a demand elasticity condition,
which implies concavity of the revenue function in price, holds. Based on this
result we can use the exchange rate pass-through coeﬃcient as a proxy for the
unobservable concavity of the revenue function in foreign prices. Speciﬁcally,
a low degree of exchange rate pass-through implies that the revenue function
is concave in foreign prices. To implement the empirical test we posit that the
lower is the degree of pass-through the more concave is the revenue function.
This in turn implies a negative (positive) relationship between the likelihood
of invoicing in the exporter’s (importer’s) and the pass-through coeﬃcient.
3 The Empirical Model
We consider in the invoicing regressions the following dependent variables:
the fraction of invoicing in the exporter’s currency, in US dollars (importer’s
currency), and in a third country currency. The explanatory variables are:
a measure of the exchange rate risk, the distance to the U.S.,6 GNP of the
exporter’s country relative to U.S. GNP, the world trade share of the ex-
porter’s country relative to U.S. world trade share, and the exchange rate
pass-through coeﬃcients that are estimated by pass-through regressions. We
turn to this task ﬁrst.
6The delivery lags vary across countries within the same industry and also across in-
dustries. Magee (1974) investigated the length of the period of contract for exports from
Japan and Germany to the U.S. and found that on average it takes 141 days from the
time of the exporter’s acceptance of orders to delivery of imports from Japan and 96 days
for imports from Germany. The distribution of contract lengths was skewed to the right,
with a maximum length of 22 months for imports from Japan and 10 months for imports
from Germany. Carse, Williamson, and Wood (1980) looked at the overall average length
of the period of contract of exports and imports of U.K. and found it to be six months
for exports and four months for imports. This evidence suggests that the further away is
the exporter’s country of origin from the U.S. market the longer is the time of delivery
and thus the higher is the exposure to exchange rate risk. We use distance as a proxy to
capture this source of risk.
73.1 Estimation of Exchange Rate Pass-Through Coef-
ﬁcients
We estimate the extent to which exchange rate changes are passed through
to import prices. For this purpose we consider each industry, and within each
industry , each country separately. We therefore carry out for each industry,
or rather commodity group, sixteen separate pass-through regressions.
We follow Feenstra (1989), among others, and use unit values for import
prices due to a lack of availability of other price data. Because of the well
known problems associated with unit values, we smooth each unit value series
with a ﬁrst order autoregressive process. The invoicing regression takes the
following form:
lnpt = α0 + α1 lnst + α2 lnw
∗
t + α3 lnqt + α4 lnIt + εt,
where lnpt is the natural logarithm of the smoothed import price in U.S.
dollars for a given commodity group in period t, st is the spot exchange rate,
w∗
t is the wage index of the foreign source country, qt is the U.S. price for
competing commodities, and It represents U.S. expenditures on the given
commodity (group). The term εt is a mean-zero white-noise error term.
Because of possible endogeneity of qt and It, we applied instrumental vari-
able techniques. The instrumental variables used are lags on the endogenous
variables, and also the U.S. wage index and U.S. consumer price index. Fur-
thermore, we experimented with lags on st instead of current period st but
this had no material eﬀect on the results.
The coeﬃcient α1 of the spot exchange rate measures the extent of pass-
through and will be used in the invoicing regressions. The other explanatory
variables control for changes in the cost of production in the source country
and for changes in demand for the given commodity. We employed the usual
proxy variables found in the pass-through literature. Wages in the source
country are the proxy for factor prices. Changes in wages are responsible for
most of the changes in production costs. Demand conditions are captured
by U.S. expenditures in each industry. U.S. import competing prices are
included to account for changes of prices of substitutes.
The pass-through regressions involve variables that are possibly inte-
grated of order one, denoted by I(1), i.e., the variables have unit roots. Two
or more of the variables included in the pass-though regression equation may
also be cointegrated with each other.7 Other variables in the pass-through
regression may be integrated of order zero [I(0)], i.e., be covariance station-
ary. Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990) proved that least squares estimates are
7Estimating the pass-through equation in ﬁrst diﬀerences, when cointegration is
present, would lead to inconsistent estimates.
8consistent when some variables are I(1) and possibly cointegrated.8 However,
the asymptotic distribution is in general not normal so that standard t- and
F-tests cannot be applied when least squares are used. This is not a problem
in our case because we are only interested in the coeﬃcient estimates. Fur-
ther, instrumental variable techniques can be applied in the standard fashion
when cointegration is present, as Hsiao (1997) has proven. In this case, even
Wald tests are asymptotically χ2 distributed.
In section 5, we subject all data to augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root
tests, choosing the lag augmentations with Akaike’s information criterion
(AIC). We ﬁnd empirical support for unit roots in the spot exchange rates
and, in addition, for cointegration of the spot exchange rate with one or more
of the other included variables in the pass-through regressions.9
Cointegration methods allow to separate short run and long run eﬀects
of pass-through.10 However, we are only concerned about the long run pass-
through eﬀect, i.e., the degree of pass-through after all adjustments have
taken place. The reason for this is that we use pass-through as a proxy
measure of concavity of the exporter’s revenue function in foreign prices. In
addition, if there is cointegration in the regression equation, and the exchange
rate is part of this relationship, then the estimate of the coeﬃcient is super-
consistent (see Engle and Granger, 1987, and Stock, 1987). In this case, the
estimate can be used in the invoicing regressions without the problems that
are usually encountered with generated regressors.
3.2 Estimation of the Invoicing Model
There are diﬀerent ways to measure exchange rate risk. We follow the ap-
proach of Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978) and use the percentage diﬀerence
between the 90 day forward exchange rate and the ex-post spot exchange
rate 3 months later. We experimented with two variants of this measure, the
squared percentage diﬀerence and the absolute value of the percentage diﬀer-
ence. It did not matter to our results which measure we used. The advantage
of a measure of risk based on the spot and forward exchange rates is that it is
based on market outcomes.11 It does not require a model of how ﬁrms form
expectations about exchange rate movements. The diﬀerence between ex-
post spot and forward rates captures unexpected changes in exchange rates
and a risk premium. A constant risk premium would not aﬀect our results.
8See also Stock and Watson (1988), and Stock and West (1988). Feenstra (1989) used
the same arguments for his pass-through regressions.
9We test for cointegration with the Engle and Granger (1987) test, using again AIC.
10See Gross and Schmitt (2000) for a study on cars imported into Switzerland.
11It is also consistent with the interpretation of excess returns on forward contracts as
a measure of the innovation in exchange rates, as suggested by Froot and Frankel (1989).
9Whether a time varying risk premium exists is controversial and it may be
very small and negligible in magnitude.12
An alternative measure of exchange rate risk that has been used in the
literature is that of volatility based on conditional variances, a GARCH pro-
cesses. In general, there is empirical evidence of some form of GARCH eﬀects
in exchange rates but usually only with high frequency daily or intra-daily
data and not with lower frequency monthly data, as discussed for example
in Baillie and Bollerslev (1989). The time horizon relevant for our purposes
is longer than a few days and 3 months seem a good approximation to the
average delivery lags after a contract for exports is signed. The literature has
also used a measure of volatility based on a moving average of standard devi-
ations of past spot rates, however, such a measure is in general not consistent
with rational expectations as proven by Pagan and Ullah (1988).
We include in our invoicing regressions a proxy to capture diﬀerent de-
livery lags. The distance of the exporter’s country of origin to the US is
positively correlated with the delivery time. The longer the delivery time,
the greater is the exposure to exchange rate risk. The distance is therefore
an additional variable to capture exchange rate risk.
The size of a country in term of GNP relative to U.S. GNP may aﬀect
invoicing decisions. The same holds true for a country’s share in world trade.
We include these two variables in our regressions to test alternative hypothe-
ses of invoicing advanced by Krugman (1984) and Tavlas (1991). The larger
a country and the higher its share in world trade, the more likely it is that
invoicing will be in its own currency.
We model the choice faced by an exporter as a multinomial logit model.
We use a speciﬁcation for the probability of invoicing in currency j based,
for example, on the model in Greene (2000), Chapter 19.7, but add a time
dimension to his pure cross-section model:13








The index j = 0 refers to invoicing in the exporter’s currency, j = 1 to invoic-
ing in the importer’s currency, and j = 2 denotes invoicing in a third country
currency. The index i = 1,2,...,16 refers to the 16 countries considered and
m = 1,2,...,43 denotes the 43 industries. The index t = 1,2,...,24 refers
to the time periods in our panel.
The model needs to be normalized. We assume for that purpose that
12See Baillie and Bollerslev (2000).
13Greene also discusses the issue of the independence of irrelevant alternatives which is
not a problem in our application.
10β0 = 0 for j = 0, being the choice of the exporter’s currency, so that:
















where dijmt is the proportion of imports from country i invoiced in currency
j for industry m in period t. The vector ximt contains the exchange rate
risk for country i currency versus the US dollar at time t, the pass-through
degree (elasticity) of imports in industry m from country i, the distance
of country i from the U.S., the size of country i in terms of relative GNP,
and the world trade share of country i. The world trade share and GNP
share of the exporter is relative to that of the U.S. world trade and U.S.
GNP, respectively. In the estimations, we account for unbalanced panels
(see Hsiao, 1986).
The coeﬃcient estimates βj in the logit function do not have the usual
interpretation. We calculate therefore the marginal eﬀects of the xi on the
probabilities and report these in the tables. Our interest is not in the mag-
nitude of the estimates but rather in the sign.
According to our Testable Hypotheses, we expect the probability of in-
voicing in the importer’s currency (the U.S. dollar) relative to the exporter’s
currency, to be positively related to the riskiness of the exchange rate and to
the distance of the exporter’s country of origin from the U.S. We expect a
negative relation between invoicing in the importer’s currency and the pass-
through elasticity. The exporter’s country world trade share and its GNP,
relative to the U.S. world share and GNP, respectively are both expected
to be negatively (positively) related to the probability of invoicing in the
importer’s (exporter’s) currency.
The probability of invoicing in a third country currency instead of in the
importer’s, relative to the exporter’s currency, has diﬀerent implications for
the expected signs. According to the model of Johnson and Pick we expect
that the probability of invoicing in a third country currency is negatively
related to the exchange rate risk and distance. On the other hand, Krugman’s
and Tavlas’ models predict that only size and world trade share should have a
signiﬁcant relation. The sign should be again negative based on our deﬁnition
of the size and trade share variables. The pass-through elasticity is expected
to be negatively related to invoicing in the third country currency.
4 Data Sources
We turn now to describe the data and their sources.
11• Invoicing of U.S. imports: This monthly data is a record of the fraction
of imports invoiced in U.S. dollars, in the currency of the exporter or in a
third currency by country of origin at the 4-digit SIC level of classiﬁcation.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Division of International Prices, only
recently started to gather data on invoicing of U.S. imports.14 The choice
of industries is limited by the data available from the BLS. Details on the
industries are given in the appendix.
• U.S. import competing: This is a monthly index series of the domestic
producers price index at the 3 or 4-digit SIC level of classiﬁcation, obtained
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Producer Price Index Series, 1999.
• Unit value of imports. This is a monthly data series by country of
origin at the 4-digit SIC level of classiﬁcation. The composition of the 4-
digit product category may vary over time. The source is the U.S. Census
Bureau, Foreign Trade Division.
• U.S. Expenditures: To construct this variable we combined total in-
dustry expenditure with total imports at the 4-digit SIC level. We obtained
data on total industry shipments from the U.S. Census Bureau, 1999, and
data on total imports from the U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division.
The remaining data are from the International Financial Statistics (IFS)
data base distributed by the IMF:
• Consumers price index - U.S.
• Forward exchange rates - all countries, foreign currency per U.S. dollar.
• GNP - all countries
• Spot exchange rates - all countries, foreign currency per U.S. dollar.
• Total trade -all countries.
• Wages in the manufacturing sector - U.S.
• Wage, labor cost, or earnings index - all countries, except for Australia,
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, and
Switzerland, where we used a wholesale, producer price, or related index
instead, depending on the availability of data.
All data are available at a monthly frequency, except for GNP, which is
only available at quarterly frequency. However, we were able to get monthly
ﬁgures for the industrial production index from IFS. We used this index to
construct from the quarterly GNP ﬁgures a monthly series. For this purpose,
we assumed that monthly GNP percentage changes are the same as those of
monthly industrial production. The data on capital city distances to Chicago
(Illinois) are from Fitzpatrick and Modlin (1986).
The data used in the regressions cover the period from 1996:08 to 1998:07
and are monthly observations. This is the longest period for which we could
obtain continuous data. Since not all currencies in our sample have for-
ward foreign exchange markets, we restricted our analysis to the follow-
14We thank William Alterman from the BLS for providing this data.
12ing countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the UK.
We used the econometric package TSP 4.4 to carry out all tests and esti-
mations. The maximum likelihood problem is solved with the ML procedure
and reported t-statistics are based on standard errors computed from analytic
second derivatives with the Newton method.
5 Empirical Results
First we carry out the estimation of the pass-through coeﬃcients, be-
fore proceeding to the invoicing regressions. The variables involved in the
pass-through regressions are likely to exhibit I(1) behavior, as found in past
empirical studies. We test every time series for unit roots and ﬁnd rather
mixed results since no variable is uniformly I(0) or I(1) across countries and
industries.15 However, we ﬁnd mostly evidence in favor of I(1), especially
for the exchange rate. In addition, we tested for cointegration as outlined in
section 3.1. We ﬁnd empirical support in every pass-through regression for
at least one cointegrating relationship that involves the exchange rate. This
allows us to view the estimated pass-through coeﬃcients as super-consistent.
For the pass-trough regressions, we apply instrumental variables estima-
tion. A few of the estimates are unreasonably large and we therefore restrict
our analysis to those countries and industries (commodities) where the pass-
through coeﬃcient takes on values between -1.26 and +1.26. This way we
obtain 273 pass-through coeﬃcient estimates, which represent elasticities.16
We now turn to our results for the invoicing regressions. We start with a
general speciﬁcation. Table 2 reports results for the model normalized on the
exporter’s currency, with the exchange rate risk, the pass-through elasticity,
the GNP and trade shares, and the distance as explanatory variables. For
the choice of invoicing in the importer’s currency, relative to the exporter’s
currency, the exchange rate risk has the expected positive marginal eﬀect
and the pass-through elasticity has the expected negative marginal eﬀect.
Also, the second variable that captures exchange rate risk, distance, has the
expected positive sign, whereas the GNP and trade shares have the wrong
coeﬃcient sign for the marginal eﬀect on invoicing. The distance variable
enters the regressions very signiﬁcantly. The other variables have the correct
sign but do not enter signiﬁcantly. This is likely due to multi-collinearity
among the included variables. It suggests to exclude some of the insigniﬁcant
15We tested also for two unit roots but rejected the hypothesis of two unit roots in all
cases.
16The pass-through regression results are available upon request.
13variables and to re-estimate the model.
In Table 2 we also present the results for invoicing in a third country
currency, relative to the exporter’s currency. The coeﬃcient estimates have
the predicted sign for all variables. The pass-through elasticity, the GNP
share and the distance enter the regression signiﬁcantly, whereas the exchange
rate risk and the trade share are both insigniﬁcant. The GNP share is not
very signiﬁcant. These results do not provide much support for the theories
of Krugman (1984) and Tavlas (1991). On the other hand, the results provide
support to the Testable Hypotheses (i) and (iv) which are derived from the
theoretical models of Donnenfeld and Zilcha (1991), Johnson and Pick (1997),
and Friberg (1998).
We delete the insigniﬁcant trade share variable from our regressions and
experiment with a speciﬁcation that allows for interaction between the ex-
change rate risk and the distance. This new variable seems to capture risk
better than either one when included separately in our regressions. We there-
fore use this speciﬁcation and report results in Table 3. The GNP–share is
no longer signiﬁcant in this speciﬁcation, whereas it was a borderline case
before. The coeﬃcient of the interaction variable for exchange rate risk and
distance, and the pass-through elasticity have both the predicted sign for the
marginal eﬀect and both coeﬃcients show signiﬁcance.
We move next to a speciﬁcation without the insigniﬁcant GNP–share
variable and list results in Table 4. The risk interaction variable is highly
signiﬁcant and has the predicted relation to invoicing in the importer’s and
third country currency (relative to the exporter’s currency). It has a positive
relation to invoicing in the importer’s currency and a negative relation to in-
voicing in the third country currency. The pass-through variable is signiﬁcant
too and also has the predicted inﬂuence on invoicing. It shows a negative re-
lation to the probability of invoicing in the importer’s currency and a positive
relation to invoicing in the third country currency. The results reported in
Table 4 provide strong support for the explanations of invoicing stated in the
Testable Hypotheses (i) and (iv). The concavity of the exporter’s revenue
function in foreign prices, captured by the pass-through variable, and the
exchange rate risk play an important role in explaining the invoicing pattern
observed for U.S. imports. Krugman (1984) and Tavlas (1991) explanations
are, however, not supported by our empirical evidence.
6 Conclusions
There is no general theory that explains in what currency the prices of exports
and imports are set. Several empirical regularities are usually highlighted but
14they are not derived from well established theoretical foundations. More re-
cently, attempts were made to derive predictions about the choice of currency
of invoice from acceptable theoretical foundations, although in a partial equi-
librium framework. Despite their narrow focus, these models were capable to
generate sharp predictions: under ﬂuctuating exchange rates exporters will
prefer to set export prices in the importer’s national currency rather than
the exporter’s national currency.
This paper tested this prediction in conjunction with two somewhat ad
hoc explanations. One is that the currency of important players in world
trade is mostly used for invoicing. The other is that the relative size of the
trading countries is an important factor.
We tested these hypotheses regarding the choice of the currency of invoice
of U.S. imports and found that the share in world trade and the relative size
of a country (in terms of GNP) do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on choosing
the currency of invoice. On the other hand, the exchange rate risk and
distance have a positive and signiﬁcant impact on invoicing in the importer’s
currency, relative to the exporter’s currency. Also, the exchange rate pass-
through elasticity is negatively and signiﬁcantly related to invoicing in the
importer’s currency, relative to the exporter’s currency. The probability of
invoicing in the third country currency, relative to the exporter’s currency,
shows a negative relation to exchange rate risk and a positive relation to the
pass-through elasticity. Both relations are signiﬁcant. These empirical results
are consistent with the theoretical models recently advanced by Donnenfeld
and Zilcha (1991), Johnson and Pick (1997), and Friberg (1998).
15Appendix: List of SIC-4 industries:
0913 Shellﬁsh
1011 Iron ores
1311 Natural gas hybrid
2035 Pickled fruit and vegetables
2311 Men’s and boys’ suits and coats
2321 Men’s and boys’ shirts
2323 Men’s and boys’ neck-ware
2331 Women’s blouses
2385 Waterproof garment
2421 Lumber and other sawmill products
2621 Paper mill products
2731 Books and pamphlets
2791 Printing and typesetting
2833 Medicinal and botanical drugs
2861 Gum and wood chemicals
2999 Petroleum and coal products
3011 Tires and inner tubes
3143 Men’s footwear, except athletic
3161 Luggage
3299 Non-metallic mineral products
3423 Hand and edge tools
3429 Hardware, nspf
3452 Bolts, nuts, screws
3491 Industrial valves
3511 Turbine and generator sets
3519 Internal combustion engines
3523 Farm machinery and equipment
3531 Construction machinery
3534 Elevators and moving stairways
3561 Pumps and pumping equipment
3577 Computer peripheral equipment
3612 Transformers and parts
3613 Switchgear and switchboard apparatus
3621 Motor and generator parts
3634 Electric housewares and fans
3639 Household appliances
3645 Residential electric lighting ﬁxtures
3650 Household audio equipment
3651 Radio and TV receiving sets
3652 Pre-recorded records and tapes
163661 Telephone and telegraph apparatus
3663 Radio and TV communication equipment
3669 Other communication equipment
3674 Semiconductor and related devices, parts
3679 Electronic components
3695 Recording media





3911 Jewelry of precious metals
3944 Games, toys
3949 Sporting and athletic goods
3999 Manufactured articles, nspf
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19Exporter’s Currency Importer’s Currency Third Currency
Australia (1) 4.7 94.0 1.3
Austria (2) 22.6 77.3 0.1
Belgium (3) 13.3 85.9 0.8
Canada (5) 4.8 92.8 2.4
Denmark (7) 2.4 97.5 0.1
Germany (10) 41.2 58.8 0
Italy (12) 17.3 82.7 0
Japan (13) 1.4 85.3 13.7
Netherlands (15) 5.4 94.5 1.0
New Zealand (16) 0 100 0
Norway (17) 0 100 0
Singapore (19) 7.6 92.4 0
Spain (21) 28.0 62.2 9.8
Sweden (22) 28.0 68.6 0.9
Switzerland (23) 58.4 40.8 0.8
U.K (25) 17.2 82.8 0
Table 1. Currency of invoicing by a group of major exporters to
the U.S. during 1996-1998. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Inter-
national Trade Division. The numbers in parentheses refer to the country
codes used in the ﬁgures.
20Table 2.   The Multinomial Logit Model for Invoicing: Maximum Likelihood Results for the 
Model with all Variables 
 
 
Note:  Absolute values of t-statistics are given in parentheses.  Boldfaced coefficient estimates 
indicated that the sign is consistent with the theoretical predictions.  Boldfaced t-statistics indicate 







Table 3.    The Multinomial Logit Model for Invoicing: Maximum Likelihood Results for the 


















Table 4.    The Multinomial Logit Model for Invoicing: Maximum Likelihood Results for the 
Preferred Model 
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